O Direito a Vida no STF texto Caio Moyses

Os direitos fundamentais genuínos têm duas características essenciais:
(i) são direitos institucionais que expressam concepções sobre direitos morais de fundo; e (ii) são direitos em “sentido forte”. Ausente qualquer uma dessas características, não há direito fundamental, ainda que se trate de direito previsto em uma carta constitucional234.

6. Uma digressão. Dworkin e o Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro

Em

2008,

o

Supremo

Tribunal

Federal

brasileiro

julgou

a

constitucionalidade da utilização de células-tronco embrionárias para fins de pesquisa e terapia235 , e, desde 2004, espera-se o seu pronunciamento sobre a existência e os limites do direito da gestante de realizar o aborto de um feto anencéfalo236. Nesta seção, trataremos dessas discussões à luz da teoria dos
234

“I said that in the United States citizens are supposed to have certain fundamental rights against their Government, certain moral rights made into legal rights by the Constitution. If this idea is significant, and worth bragging about, then these rights must be rights in the strong sense I just described. The claim that citizens have a right of free speech must imply that it would be wrong for the
Government to stop them from speaking, even when the Government believes that what they will say will cause more harm than good. ( ) Not all legal rights, or even Constitutional rights, represent moral rights against the Government. I now have the legal right to drive either way on Fifty-seventh Street, but the Government would do no wrong to make that street one-way if it thought it in the general interest to do so. I have a Constitutional right to vote for a congressman every two years, but the national and state governments would do no wrong if, following the amendment procedure, they made a congressman’s term four years instead of two, again on the basis of a judgment that this would be for the general good. But those Constitutional rights that we call fundamental like the right of free