International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels Author(s): John S. Duffield Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 819-855 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706876 . Accessed: 25/04/2012 09:44
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International regimes and alliance behavior:explaining NATO conventional force levels
John Duffield S.
The military postureof the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO) has entered a period of profoundchange. For the first time inmore than two decades, the alliance has revised its formal militarystrategyof flexible response.'More visibly, NATO conventional forcelevelsare declining sharply as a result (1) thelimits of on acceptedbyGermany thesize ofitsarmedforces, (2) the implementation the treaty conventional of on forcesin Europe (CFE), and (3) further troopreductions alliancemembers.2 by ofAgainstthisbackdropofchange,itis easyto lose sight thefactthatpriorto the recent dramatic political developmentsin Europe, NATO's military stable forsome threedecades. The size of the posturehad been remarkably forcesin particular had fluctuated alliance's conventional very little, especially in the criticalCentral Region of Europe. Stability had largelycharacterized of both the overalllevel of conventional forcesand therelativecontributions withforcesin the region.The primary NATO countries departurefromthis of otherwise staticpictureoccurredas a consequenceof thecompletion highly in WestGermanrearmament themid-1960s. Even thatdevelopment, however, conformed plans thathad been drawnup morethantenyearsearlier. to
of An earlierversionof thisarticlewas presentedat the meeting theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,San Francisco,30 August-2 September1990. For helpfulcommentson previous CherylEschbach,Sandra Gubin,David drafts, would like to thankRobertBeck, Mark Brawley, I Nina Tannenwald,Steve Weber, and, especially, Hendrickson, Lisa Martin,Herman Schwartz, Steven Finkel for Organization. Stephen Krasner and two anonomyousreviewers International I to For researchsupport, am grateful the analysis.provided valuable assistancewiththe statistical HarvardUniversity. Affairs, CenterforScience and International 39 1. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,"NATO Review (December 1991), pp. 25-32. The is everto be made public. newNATO strategy document thefirst with 2. The size limits Germanforcesare containedin the "Treatyon the Final Settlement on in Today20 (October 1990),pp. 33-34. For whichisreprinted ArmsControl Respect to Germany," An and of see a discussion theCFE treaty, Ivo H. Daalder, TheCFE Treaty: Overview an Assessment D.C.: The Johns 1991). HopkinsForeignPolicyInstitute, (Washington, 46, International Organization 4, Autumn1992 ? 1992 bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the Massachusetts of Institute Technology
Organization 820 International forcelevels in the in This recordofmarkedstability NATO conventional Central Region cannot be adequately explained by the leading structural theory itsrefinement, and Balance-of-power relations. of theories international thatoverallalliance forcelevels shouldhave theory, suggest balance-of-threat varied somewhatmore than actuallywas the case in response to changes in and of Western perceptions Sovietintentions, capabilities,...
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